Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commision and Murray City Corporation : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commision and
Murray City Corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig Hall; Murray City\'s Attorney\'s Office; Williams & Hunt; Dennis C. Ferguson; Attorneys for
Respondents.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Bryon J. Benevento; D. Matthew Moscon; Attorneys for
Petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








W<ETNO. ^ ?23 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD J. LUCAS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION and MURRAY CITY 
CORPORATION, 
Respondents. 
Appeal No. 960803-CA 
Priority No. 14 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
AN APPEAL FROM A DECISION ISSUED BY THE MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION ON NOVEMBER 27,1996. 
Craig Hall, Esq. 
Murray City Attorney's Office 
5025 South State Street 
Murray City, Utah 84157-0520 
Telephone: (801)264-2642 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq, 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (521-5678) 
Attorneys for Respondents 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 
D. Matthew Moscon (6947) 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
FILED 
JUN - 4 1997 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD J. LUCAS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION and MURRAY CITY 
CORPORATION, 
Respondents. 
Appeal No. 960803-CA 
Priority No. 14 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
AN APPEAL FROM A DECISION ISSUED BY THE MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION ON NOVEMBER 27,1996. 
Craig Hall, Esq. 
Murray City Attorney's Office 
5025 South State Street 
Murray City, Utah 84157-0520 
Telephone: (801)264-2642 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq, 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (521-5678) 
Attorneys for Respondents 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 
D. Matthew Moscon (6947) 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. OFFICER LUCAS HAS PRESENTED THE APPROPRIATE 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
II. THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE 
COMMISSION ARE INAPPOSITE 2 
III. EVIDENCE THAT OFFICER LUCAS WAS DISCHARGED AS AN 
ACT OF RETALIATION WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED 3 
A. The Commission is Bound to Follow These Rules of Evidence 
When Practical 3 
1. The Commission Erred If the Utah Rules of Evidence Applied 4 
B. Even if the Utah Rules of Evidence Did Not Apply, The 
Commission Erred 5 
IV. THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY EXCLUDED A TAPE 
RECORDED RETRACTION BY OFFICER LUCAS' ACCUSER 5 
A. Officer Lucas Properly Objected to the Commission's Ruling 6 
V. THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY IGNORED MURRAY 
CITY'S PROCEDURAL ERRORS 7 
VI. THE COMMISSION IMPROPERLY ALLOWED ITS LEGAL 
ADVISOR TO PARTICIPATE AS A COMMISSIONER 9 
VII. THE COMMISSION'S ERRORS HARMED OFFICER LUCAS 10 
A. Regarding the Evidence of Retaliation 11 
B. Regarding the Taped Retraction by Officer Lucas' Accuser 12 
C. Regarding the Commission's Failure to Analyze the City's 
Procedural Errors 12 
248/146044 i 
VIII. THE SANCTION OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION WAS 
EXCESSIVE 13 
IX. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S DECISION 14 
CONCLUSION 15 
248/146044 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Adams v. Industrial Comm'n. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 14 
Anderson v. City of Lawton. 748 P.2d 53 (Ok. App. 1987) 9 
Anderson v. Sharp. 899 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 6 
Harken v. Board of Oil. Gas and Minerals. 920P.2d 1176 (Utah 1996) 15 
King v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 1 
One Int'l. Inc. v. Eleventh Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993) 4 
Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983) 4 
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm'n. 908 P.2d 871 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) 10 
State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987) 4, 12 
State v. Jacques. 924 P.2d 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 11, 13 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 5, 8, 13 
Williams v. PSC. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988) 10 
Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept.. 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980) 9 
Rules 
Rule 103 (a)(1) Utah Rules of Evidence 6 
Rule 402 Utah Rules of Evidence 4 
Rule 608(b) Utah Rules of Evidence 12 
Rule 608(c) Utah Rules of Evidence 4 
Rule 1007 Utah Rules of Evidence 7 
248/146044 i i i 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 4 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to -06 10 
Other Authorities 




Q F F I C E R L U C A g H A g p R E S E N T E D T H E 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Murray City claims that regardless of the nature oi the uu •. u-. . -^ 
C 'iviJ Sci vice Loinnussioii s actions shouiu * • • of 
ihsctvi inn '••itandai'd Si ! mini ib not sv^por****,* hy law. A ;*wii an 
administrative agency is applying legal principles, its decisions are reviewed for 
'Doss. Sec King v. Industrial Comm n. 8DU , . 
i *** i rrection c 
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
Officer Lucas concedes that most administrative proceedings do not strictly apply 
legal principles, llowcvei, OIL J Juira> I 'ily I 'i\ il Service < 
"Cninmr.Moiri ilii HI! In Hs ovui 11 Irs nlopled the I Jtah Rules of Evidence. See Murray 
Civil Service Commission Rule 13-10. (Opening briet. exhibit T Therefore, the 
Commission's rulings on evidence and legal theories should ov. u \ icwed under a 
correctness standai cl,1 
liven if this (.*>urt applies an abuse of discretion standard to all of the issues raised, it 
must still reverse the Commission's decisions. "The fact that administrative agencies may not 
be bound by formal rules of evidence and procedure does not mean that they are above the 
law." "An agency must at some point address the legal issues raised by a party appearing 
before it" Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(discussing abuse of discretion standard in administrative proceedings). 
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II. 
THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE 
COMMISSION ARE INAPPOSITE 
In its responsive memorandum, Murray City repeats time and again that the 
Commission had only two roles at the hearing: (1) To determine whether sufficient 
facts existed to support Chief Killian's decision that Officer Lucas should be disciplined 
for untruthfulness; and (2) To determine whether the discipline given was warranted 
under the circumstances. Murray City claims that because the Commission was limited 
to these two determinations, all of Officer Lucas' arguments regarding evidence, 
retaliatory motives, and procedural error are irrelevant. 
Officer Lucas does not dispute the Commission's role. However, this does not 
invalidate Officer Lucas' argument. The first role of the Commission, as articulated by 
Murray City, requires the Commission to weigh all facts available to determine whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support Chief Killian's decision. Because the 
Commission suppressed critical facts, it was not able to assess whether Chief Killian's 
decision was justified under the circumstances. For example, the Commission 
suppressed the playing of an audiotape which contained a retraction by Martin Spegar, 
Officer Lucas' accuser. (R. at 575). It excluded evidence that Chief Killian and Lt. 
Fondaco were biased against Officer Lucas because he reported their alleged 
misconduct to the Utah Attorney General's office. (R. at 142-48; 162-3). The 
Commission ignored evidence that Murray City had not followed its own procedures in 
conducting the investigation of Officer Lucas. (R. at 707-17). These issues are directly 
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n'k'van! to the Commissions' determination of whether the facts available supported 
Chief Killian's deeiv n to fire Officer T.ucas. 
In short, the rok %,i
 s.:*. * uiuin,.^..!.. .4 ' • 
demonstrating i dishonest, that h^ accujv. *.~d recanted 
story, that Murray City did not follow proper procedures in carrying out the internal 
affairs investigation, and that Officer Lucas was actually dismissed in retaliation for 
reporting his superior .a.vgedmiscoiiilii< I 
in, 
EVIDENCE THAT OFFICER LUCAS WAS DISCHARGED 
AS AN ACT OF RETALIATION WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED 
Murray f "ih «i "yiios l)m il»«" < "<»mmissiori^  decision to exclude evidence that 
Offn ••• : ucas was terminated in retaliation for participation in an Attorne\ Gener.*' 
investigation was appropriate because (1) the Commission Is not bomu .. 1 
Rules of Evidence, (,.!) the evidence was induum!, .1 il ( 11 m ru 1T1I 
ti inn v i. mi in mi in Mii'sr anniments are without invent. 
A. THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO FOLLOW THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
WHEN PRACTICAL 
I' i. 111 I s 111«•"-. *»( l\ii1niiT are not sun <K -"^plied at an administrative hearing 
unless the agency ac nn< i k iules. See Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Services. 
450, 453 (Utah 198? i u-.i ,,- .,,L .Kunne t,.* v w. . .-o- j . 
" Because the City argues that each of the Commission's errors, was iiai inks'. ( HTirer 
.«-
1
 discuss the harm to his case cumulatively in Section VII, infra. 
Murray City attempts to distinguish Pilcher on the grounds that ii applies n ;h, v.ti 
r r;v;\ Procedure, not the I Jtah Rules of Evidence. This, however, is not a n u... 
''fo>*mole contmui <J v 
248 .^r. :-, 
with a copy of its Rules and Regulations which state that "At all hearings, the 
Commission will determine the admissibility of evidence and shall use as near as it 
deems practicable the Rules of Evidence followed by courts of this State." (Id. § 13-10) 
(emphasis added). 
1. The Commission Erred If the Utah Rules of Evidence Applied 
Murray City argues that even if the Utah Rules of Evidence applied, evidence of 
retaliation was still properly excluded as irrelevant pursuant to Rule 402. However, the 
City does not justify this position in light of the rules that specifically allow introduction 
of evidence of "bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent " Utah R. Evid. 608(c). 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (same). In fact, it is well established under Utah 
law that testimony reflecting bias of a witness is relevant and admissible. Ong Int'l, Inc. 
v. Eleventh Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 459 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200, 202 (Utah, 1987) (bias evidence is always relevant). Therefore, evidence that 
the internal affairs investigator and Chief Killian were biased against Officer Lucas, and 
wanted to fire him as an act of revenge, should have been admitted. Such evidence 
reflects directly on their credibility and the grounds for their decision to terminate 
Officer Lucas' employment. 
distinction. The clear import of Pilcher is that administrative agencies are not required to 
follow formal legal rules unless the agency has adopted those rules. Id. "Thus, administrative 
proceedings are not subject to the [Rules] unless the governing statute or regulations so 
provide." Id. (Emphasis added). 
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B. EVEN IF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE DID NOT APPLY, THE 
COMMISSION ERRED, 
Even if this Court determines that the Utah Rules of Evidence did not apply at the 
hearing, the Commission's decision must be reversed. "Despite the flexibility of 
administrative hearings [with respect to] evidence, due process requires minimum 
safeguards,... all parties must be . . . given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to 
request documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can 
a party maintain its rights or make its defense." Tolman, 819 P.2d at 29 (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). "The fact that administrative agencies may not be bound by 
formal rules of evidence . . . does not mean that they are above the law." Id. at 31. The 
Commission's decision to prevent Officer Lucas from proving he was fired in retaliation 
for reporting internal corruption prevented him from "making his defense" and is 
reversible under Tolman. Id. at 29. 
IV. 
THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY EXCLUDED 
A TAPE RECORDED RETRACTION BY 
OFFICER LUCAS' ACCUSER 
It is undisputed that Martin Spegar, the person who accused Officer Lucas of 
pointing a gun at his head, later retracted portions of his testimony in a taped interview 
with a polygrapher. The interview followed Mr. Spegar's polygraph exam in which he 
scored an overall -3 (indicating dishonesty) (R. 323-6). The Commission prevented 
Officer Lucas from playing the taped retraction as impeachment of Mr. Spegar's 
testimony before the Commission. Murray City's only arguments as to why the taped 
retraction by Officer Lucas' accuser was properly excluded are (1) Officer Lucas never 
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objected to the decision excluding the evidence and (2) the error was harmless. Both 
arguments are baseless. 
A. OFFICER LUCAS PROPERLY OBJECTED TO THE COMMISSION'S 
RULING 
Officer Lucas's counsel expressly objected to the Commission's ruling that the 
audiotape could not be played. (R. at 575). Utah law regarding sufficiency of 
objections clarifies that counsel's role in objecting is to allow the tribunal a chance to 
correct its mistake at the time of occurrence. See Anderson v. Sharp, 899 P.2d 1245, 
1248 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). That clearly occurred. Furthermore, the rule requiring a 
clear objection specifies that it applies when the Court is admitting objectionable 
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (clear objection must be made if ruling is to allow 
inadmissible evidence). Thus, the burden was on the City to object to the admission of 
the tape, which the City did not do in a timely manner. (R. 574). Lastly, because of the 
confusion created by a sua sponte ruling by the Commission's legal adviser, any 
decision by this Court about the sufficiency of counsel's objection should err toward 
finding an objection to have been made.4 
Murray City also contends that the Commission would have allowed the evidence 
to be authenticated by Lt. Vern Petersen, the polygrapher who taped the interview. This 
4
 Counsel was at a disadvantage as to how and when to object since Mr. Ferguson (the 
"legal advisor") made the decision to exclude the tape prior to any objection from Murray City 
and without question by any Commissioner about the recording's admissibility. Therefore, it is 
unclear when the "ruling" was made. (See R. at 575). Nevertheless, it is clear that Officer 
Lucas' counsel attempted to play the tape and have Mr. Spegar lay the proper foundation even 
after Mr. Ferguson indicated he did not want the tape played. Thus, the Commission had the 
chance to correct its ruling. 
248/146044 C 
argument contradicts the rule of evidence stating that the party whose voice is recorded 
is the property party to authenticate a recording. UtahR.Evid. 1007. Moreover, the 
City omits the fact that as soon as the Commission made the ruling in question, Murray 
City's counsel informed Lt. Petersen (who was under a subpoena) that he was free to 
leave, irrespective of his subpoena. Murray City did not inform the Commission or 
Officer Lucas' counsel of its actions. Thus, when Officer Lucas attempted to call Lt. 
Peterson to authenticate the tape, Lt. Petersen was unavailable. In an effort to comply 
with the Commission's instructions to complete the hearing that day, Officer Lucas 
proceeded forward by introducing the transcript of the audiotape of Mr. Spegar's 
polygraph interview. (Transcript at p. 211). However, there was no witness to lay the 
foundation for this testimony, and Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian denied reviewing the 
transcript or the audiotape prior to their decision to fire Officer Lucas. Thus, the effect 
of the recantation by Mr. Spegar and the chance to discredit Mr. Spegar were lost.5 
V. 
THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY IGNORED 
MURRAY CITY'S PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
Officer Lucas contends that the Commission erred when it failed to analyze or 
even mention his argument that Murray City purposefully disobeyed its own procedures 
in order to terminate his employment. See Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31-2 ("at a minimum, 
the [Commission] should have addressed [his] legal contentions in its findings and 
5
 Officer Lucas notes that this confusion and prejudice to his case presentation were 
some of the harms caused by the Commission's decision to allow Mr. Ferguson to participate as 
he did. 
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conclusions"). Murray City's responses to this point were (1) Officer Lucas never 
identified any procedural deficiencies; and (2) Officer Lucas was not terminated as a 
result of procedural errors, but because of dishonesty. 
Officer Lucas introduced evidence before the Commission that Murray City had 
failed to follow its own procedures. He urged the Commission to set aside the discipline 
based upon these procedural deficiencies. This evidence included the following errors: 
(1) The internal affairs investigation of Officer Lucas lasted more than 30 
days whereas Murray City Policy and Procedure requires such 
investigations to be completed within 30 days (R. 707-9); 
(2) Officer Lucas was never informed at any time that the internal affairs 
investigation against him had been changed from one of excessive force 
to one of dishonesty, whereas City policy requires investigations to 
inform an Officer of the scope of their investigation (R. 710); 
(3) Officer Lucas had not been provided with a written statement of the 
charges against him before he was interrogated by Lt. Fondaco in 
contravention of City policy and procedure (R. 709-10); 
(4) The failure to notify Officer Lucas of the original charge against him 
(excessive force) and that the investigation had changed to one of 
dishonesty were both violations of City policy (R. 710-13); and 
(5) Lt. Fondaco never contacted the Utah Attorney General's Office or any 
other investigative authority regarding the internal affairs investigation 
of excessive force as indicated by City policy (R. 716-17). 
The fact that the Commission failed to address this issue in its decision does not 
mean that Officer Lucas did not raise it. To the contrary, it demonstrates that the 
Commission erred in evaluating this defense. 
It is also noteworthy that Murray City failed to distinguish, or even contest the 
cases cited by Officer Lucas which hold that public employers must follow established 
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procedure before disciplinary actions can be sustained. Officers have a property 
interest in continued employment as well as the procedures which protect their 
employment rights. See e^., Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 601-2 
(Utah 1980); Anderson v. City of Lawton, 748 P.2d 53, 55 (Ok. App. 1987) (officer 
discharged outside of established policy must be reinstated). 
VI. 
THE COMMISSION IMPROPERLY ALLOWED 
ITS LEGAL ADVISOR TO PARTICIPATE 
AS A COMMISSIONER 
In response to Officer Lucas' argument that the Commission inappropriately 
allowed its legal advisor to conduct interrogation of fact witnesses, to comment on 
evidence on the record, and to make sua sponte rulings, Murray City contends that the 
Commission was justified in so acting because it was called upon to make numerous 
complex legal rulings, and therefore, participation by a legal advisor was mandated. 
Officer Lucas first calls attention to the inherent contradiction in Murray City's 
arguments. In dealing with the Commission's evidentiary errors, Murray City argues 
that the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply and the Commission's only role was to 
make factual findings. Conversely, in explaining Mr. Ferguson's role, Murray City 
argues that the Commission had so many complicated legal decisions to make that it had 
to retain a legal advisor. Officer Lucas agrees that the Commission had legal decisions 
to make, and Murray City's concession on this point demonstrate that its arguments to 
the contrary are disingenuous. 
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However, even this concession does not justify the Commission's actions. As 
Murray City also concedes, this Court should reverse the Commission if it finds the 
Commission acted outside its scope of authority. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Civil 
Service Comm'n, 908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). It is outside of the 
Commission's authority to allow a non-commissioner to interrogate fact witnesses, 
comment and give his opinion on witness' statements, and make sua sponte rulings 
without request by any commissioner. Mr. Ferguson acted not only as a fourth 
commissioner, he participated more than all commissioners combined. Such conduct is 
clearly beyond the scope of the Utah Code which narrowly defines the number, 
qualification, and role of civil service commissioners. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-
1001 to -06; see also, Williams v. PSC 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) ("any reasonable 
doubt of the existence of any [administrative] power must be resolved against the 
existence thereof). Accordingly, the decision of the Commission cannot stand. 
VII. 
THE COMMISSION'S ERRORS 
HARMED OFFICER LUCAS 
In numerous sections, Murray City argues that even if the Commission did err, its 
errors were harmless. Interestingly, Murray City has not attempted to demonstrate that 
the harms Officer Lucas has already listed in his opening brief (e.g. opening brief at p. 
31) were not sufficiently harmful. Instead, the City makes the bald assertion that all of 
the Commission's errors were harmless, without addressing Officer Lucas' claims. 
Officer Lucas concedes that the Commission's decisions will not be reversed if 
its errors are found "sufficiently inconsequential that [this Court] concludes there is no 
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reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. 
Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
In Jacques, the Court outlined the factors relevant to the determination of whether 
an error was harmful. 
In determining whether reversal is required, several factors 
are considered including "the importance of the witnesses' 
testimony to the . . . case, whether the testimony was 
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness 
on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
furnished, and, of course, the overall strength of the . . . 
case." 
Id. at 903 (citation omitted). Based on this standard, the Commission's errors were 
harmful to Officer Lucas' case. 
A. REGARDING EVIDENCE OF RETALIATION 
Retaliation was key to Officer Lucas' defense because it explained why the City 
wanted to terminate his employment and why the City was willing to violate its own 
policies to do so. Moreover, it was not cumulative of other defenses presented by 
Officer Lucas. The Commission did not simply exclude one witness on this point, but 
all evidence demonstrating retaliation. Thus, there was no likelihood that the 
Commission understood the facts through testimony that was admitted. Finally, Officer 
Lucas proffered numerous corroborating witnesses to support the defense, but the 
Commission still refused to allow any evidence of retaliation. 
Exclusion of this evidence must be presumed to have prejudiced Officer Lucas' 
case. "[EJvidence of bias or motive is always relevant as discrediting the witness and 
affecting the weight of his testimony." State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 202 (Utah 
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1987). "Therefore, if a prior instance of conduct is relevant to a witness' bias or motive 
to testify differently than would otherwise be the case, evidence pertaining to that 
conduct is not subject to exclusion under Rule 608(b)." Id. Cases which have found 
exclusion of such testimony harmless error have almost uniformly done so on the 
ground that the fact finder "had sufficient information to fully appraise [the witness'] 
biases and motivations" without the evidence. E.g., Hackford, 737 P.2d at 205. The 
Commission had no other evidence before it regarding bias. 
B. REGARDING THE TAPED RETRACTION BY OFFICER LUCAS' ACCUSER 
A tape recorded retraction by Officer Lucas' accuser was perhaps the most 
damaging evidence against the City's case. As pointed out numerous times by the City, 
Officer Lucas was fired for the alleged dishonesty of denying that the pointed his gun at 
Mr. Spegar, not for excessive force. Hence, if Officer Lucas could prove that Mr. 
Spegar lied when he accused Officer Lucas, that would also prove Officer Lucas was 
being truthful when he denied the conduct. Again, Officer Lucas was not simply 
prevented from cross-examining Mr. Spegar about the tape, but from even playing the 
tape to the Commission. As highlighted by Jacques, the error was made perse harmful 
because of the importance of the witness involved, his accuser. Officer Lucas was 
prevented from effectively cross-examining Mr. Spegar regarding his accusation and 
allowing the Commission to assess Mr. Spegar's credibility. 
C. REGARDING THE COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO ANALYZE THE CITY'S 
PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
In order to have a fair hearing it is critical that the Commission listen to and 
analyze a grievant's arguments. Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31. Officer Lucas argued that 
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Murray City intentionally ignored procedures in order to fire him. During the hearing, 
the City's internal affairs investigator admitted to violating several procedures designed 
to protect an officer's employment rights. (R. 707-17). The Commission did not even 
address Officer Lucas' arguments regarding procedural errors in any of its findings or 
conclusions. Officer Lucas was harmed by this error because without explanation from 
a tribunal of why it rejects or does not reach an argument, a hearing serves no purpose. 
Id. This Court has previously held that when an agency neglects to address an issue "the 
party wishing to defend an agency decision has the burden of showing that the 
undisclosed finding was actually made." Adams v. Industrial Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, Officer Lucas is presumed to be harmed unless Murray 
City proves otherwise. See id. Murray City has not even attempted this showing. 
vra. 
THE SANCTION OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION 
WAS EXCESSIVE 
In the end, this entire case came down to a question of whether Officer Lucas, 
during a hostile search, had his gun out of his holster and pointed in a low-ready 
position or merely in its holster with his hand on the grip. Even if the Commission and 
the Court assume for argument that Officer Lucas knew his gun was pointed at the 
ground and yet said it was in its holster, that conduct does not warrant termination. 
Chief Killian and Lt. Fondaco admitted that during the entire investigation 
period, Officer Lucas was able to effectively perform his duties as an officer. He was 
never placed on leave. Thus, it was clear, even from the City's witnesses, that Officer 
Lucas could have continued his job. Because the City admitted to adopting a policy of 
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progressive discipline, the sanction of employment termination under such 
circumstances was unjustified. Moreover, other officers who had been accused of more 
egregious dishonesty, and who later admitted that they had lied, were not fired by the 
City. Therefore, the decision to fire Officer Lucas was arbitrary. 
An officer with over 10 years of service, an unblemished record, and a recipient 
of numerous awards should not be fired because his Chief believes his weapon was 
drawn in a low ready position rather than in its holster. Such discipline is 
disproportionate, and abusive. 
IX. 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT 
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION 
The parties agree that this Court's review of the Commission's factual 
determinations must be whether "substantial evidence" which would "convince a 
reasonable mind" exists to support the Commission's decision. E.g., Harken v. Board of 
Oil Gas and Minerals, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996). In his opening brief, Officer 
Lucas devoted six pages (pp. 14-19) to marshalling the evidence in order to demonstrate 
that no evidence of an intent to deceive was introduced. 
Murray City's only response is that Officer Lucas' initial statement (that he did 
not draw his weapon) compared to his later statement (that he does not remember 
drawing his weapon, but concedes he may have done so if another officer saw his 
weapon out) is inconsistent. Thus, Murray City claims Officer Lucas was reasonably 
believed to be lying. 
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Officer Lucas introduced expert testimony through Dr. Kenneth Rodgers 
indicating that such an inability to recall whether a weapon was in a holster or in a low 
ready position is normal under the circumstances. Dr. Rodgers' testimony was not 
rebutted. Murray City put on no witness who claimed Officer Lucas intended to deceive 
Lt. Fondaco or Chief Killian. Officer Lucas quite candidly told his superiors that he did 
not remember drawing his weapon, but would not contradict an officer who says he saw 
Officer Lucas do so; Officer Lucas simply could not recall. 
Not only did Murray City fail to put on "substantial evidence" that Officer Lucas 
was being deceitful when he made this statement; no evidence was put on that Officer 
Lucas intended to deceive his superiors or tried to prevent others from disclosing the 
truth to his supervisors. To the contrary, when Officer Snow indicated to Officer Lucas 
that he had seen Officer Lucas' weapon out of its holster, Officer Lucas encouraged 
Officer Snow to give that information to Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian. (R. 618). 
Murray City has not and cannot provide substantial evidence to demonstrate that 
Officer Lucas wanted to deceive his superiors in this situation. Thus, the Commission's 
decision to uphold Chief Killian's decision must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Following his termination for alleged dishonesty, Officer Lucas attempted to 
prove that his accuser retracted his statements; that he was fired in retaliation for a prior 
report to the Attorney General rather than the alleged dishonesty; and, that Murray City 
purposefully ignored its own policies and procedures in order to fire him. The 
Commission prevented Officer Lucas from having a fair opportunity to do any of these 
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things. He was prevented from playing a taped retraction of his accuser's statements; 
prevented from showing that Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian were biased against him and 
had a motive to retaliate against him for reporting their alleged misconduct to the 
Attorney General's office; and, finally in its rush to uphold Chief Killian's decision, the 
Commission failed to even acknowledge his arguments about the City's procedural 
violations. Each of these items deprived Officer Lucas of a fair hearing; cumulatively 
they ensured that Officer Lucas had no chance to "make his defense" as he was entitled. 
Lastly, no evidence was presented to indicate Officer Lucas intended to deceive 
anyone. A complete lack of evidence is not "substantial evidence." For all of these 
reasons, Officer Lucas respectfully submits that the Commission's decision to uphold 
Chief Killian's decision should be vacated and Officer Lucas reinstated with full back 
pay. , 
DATED this 7 day of June, 1997 
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